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Abstract—With the advancement of technology and subse-
quently the age of digital information, online trustworthy iden-
tification has become increasingly more important. With respect
to the various data breaches and privacy regulations, the current
identity solutions are not fully optimized. In this paper, we will
take a look at several Self-Sovereign Identity solutions which
are already available. Some of them are built upon blockchain
technology as this already provides decentralized persistent data
and consensus. We will explore the emerging landscape of Self-
Sovereign Identity solutions and dissect their implementations
under multiple aspect criteria to determine the necessity of
blockchain technology in this field. We conclude that blockchain
technology is not explicitly required for a Self-Sovereign Identity
solution but it is a good foundation to build up on, due to various
technical advantages that the blockchain has to offer.
Index Terms—Digital Identity, Identity Management Systems,
Data Privacy, Distributed Ledger
I. INTRODUCTION
A
S the internet grows rapidly, saving and accessing sensi-
tive information of users is becoming a serious problem.
The internet lacks a layer of identity protocol and this shifts
the responsibility for identification and verification to service
providers. Over time, the providers have become the central-
ized authorities and acted as the issuers and authenticators
of digital identity. This is not only highly inefficient due to
duplication of the information among them, it also prevents
users to gain insight in and control over their personal digital
identity. Since most of these identity management systems rely
on centralized databases, it poses a threat to the user when
compromised [1].
New identity management schemes , solving the above-
mentioned problems by utilizing the same digital identity
on different sites, were proposed. Some currently available
examples are Facebook Login and Google Login. One does
not need a username and password anymore to sign up for
a particular platform, reducing the information duplication
problem. Also, since the federated instances like Facebook and
Google are trusted to have a secure digital identity policy, it
seems that the authorization problem is also tackled. However,
this means that users have to rely on the federated instances
and trust these instances which makes them powerful. This
way the users still have no control over their digital identity
since they do not know what data is exactly collected and what
it is used for. A recent example is the Cambridge Analytica
scandal where Facebook gave unfettered and unauthorized
access to personally identifiable information (PII) of more than
87 million Facebook users without their consent to the data
firm Cambridge Analytica [2].
Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is a more recent solution to
this problem and aims to give users control over their own
digital identity. SSI removes the need for a central trusted au-
thority [3]. Users can store their identity data on local devices
and provide the required information to those who need it
for validation purposes. Bitcoin has played an important role
in the SSI evolution because of its underpinning Distributed
Ledger Technology (DLT) [4]. DLT seems to be promising
for SSI since it does not require a central authority to validate
transactions. Due to its append-only nature, all the published
attributes are persistently stored. It is also transparent because
the decentralized network is able to reach consensus in the
network [3]. Although blockchain seems promising there are
some limitations with respect to SSI. For example, when users
loose their private/public key pair, they are forced to start
the identity proofing process from scratch to reestablish their
digital identity [5].
Current literature mainly focuses on individual SSI solu-
tions. This paper contributes to the literature by comparing
currently available blockchain-based and other state-of-the-art
solutions. The main question we hope to answer after this
study is: Is blockchain-technology a necessity in building Self-
Sovereign Identity solutions? In order to answer this question
the following questions have to be answered first:
1) How can Self-Sovereign Identity solutions be compared?
2) How do currently available solutions score based on the
comparison criteria?
We start with introducing the current field of available
evaluation criteria and comparative studies in section III. We
follow up with the systematic search performed to gather all
the available implementations, comparative studies and other
sources on SSI in section IV. After this, in section V, we
elaborate on the evaluation criteria selected for this paper
followed by the evaluation of the found implementations in
section VI. An overview will be provided by presenting two
tables containing all the properties met by all the blockchain-
based and other implementations. Finally, we will answer the
main research question in section VIII.
2II. PRELIMINARIES
To get a better understanding of this paper some definitions
and abbreviations are explained in more detail.
Identity system: Electric information associated with an
individual in a particular identity system is called a digital
identity. Identity systems can be used for authentication and
authorization of these identities [6].
Federated instance: or a federated identity in information
technology is the process of linking a person’s electronic
identity and attributes, stored across multiple distinct identity
management systems.
Personally identifiable information (PII): Any information
that could potentially identify a person. Examples include full
name, social security number and e-mail address.
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT): A distributed ledger
is a consensus of replicated, shared, and synchronized digital
data geographically spread across multiple sites, countries, or
institutions [4].
Know-your-customer (KYC): a process to verify the iden-
tity of a user and calculate the potential risks of illegal
intentions to a business.
Anti-money laundering (AML): refers to procedures, laws
and regulations designed to stop the practice of generating
income through illegal activities.
Decentralized Identifier (DID): Independent self-controlled
identifier used to resolve to a DID document containing all the
information required to interact with the identity.
Out-of-band: Communicating data through another
medium than the one at hand. For example; authentication
through the web, with an extra out-of-band authentication via
telephone.
Smart contract: Code on the blockchain that stores rules
of an agreement, automatically verifies the fulfilment of this
agreement and eventually executes the agreed terms.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss some of the available evaluation
criteria for SSI solutions and how they relate to each other.
Next to that, we provide a summary of the comparative studies
on the subject and which criteria are used in their comparison.
In The Laws of Identity by K. Cameron [7], seven laws
are described that explain the successes and failures of digital
identity systems. K. Cameron states that these laws are neces-
sary to avoid any side-effects. The laws and their explanation
are extensive and explain the requirements of SSI solutions in
detail. However, some of these laws can be more distinctive.
The first law for example; User control and consent could be
split into Control and Consent. Some implementations may
satisfy one of these properties, but not the other.
C. Allen used these seven laws to compose a list of ten
principles that ought to be considered when implementing an
SSI solution [8]. These ten principles focus on the user control
within SSI solutions. C. Allen provides the distinction of the
seven laws we were looking for.
In Deployment of a Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign Iden-
tity by Q. Stokkink and J. Pouwelse [3], these ten principles
of C. Allen are used in assessing the digital identity solution
presented in their paper. Q. Stokkink and J. Pouwelse add an
extra property to this list, which requires claims to be provable.
X. Zhu and Y. Badr explored the possibilities of current
available authentication solutions for the internet of things [9].
Although attestations about an identity are not required for the
internet of things, several aspects do overlay like scalability,
as a large population must be capable to use the system, and
interoperability to prevent reliance on a single provider. It
briefly touches upon multiple implementations used in this
survey but does not conclude anything.
In A First Look at Identity Management Schemes on
the Blockchain [4] a comparison between Sovrin, uPort
and ShoCard with respect to the seven laws of identity of
K. Cameron is made. Sovrin and uPort are SSI solutions
whereas ShoCard is called a decentralized trusted identity.
With ShoCard, identity proofing of users based on existing
trusted credentials is stored on a blockchain. It is concluded
that distributed ledger technology is not a silver bullet and
especially the usability aspect has to improve.
A. G. Nabi provides in Comparative Study on Identity
Management Methods Using Blockchain [10] an overview of
23 identity solutions and their inner workings together with
their advantages and disadvantages. Although seemingly it is
touching the subject of comparing the solutions, it does not
clearly conclude which solution is better than others.
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To answer the research question, a complete global view of
the current state-of-the-art solutions is required. In this section
the systematic search, constructed in three steps, for published
solutions is explained. The initial search for papers about SSI
implementations consisted of structured queries, as available
in Appendix A, on both Scopus and IEEexplore. This resulted
in 170 unique papers after the removal of 20 duplicates.
Secondly, these papers were categorized in implementa-
tions, evaluation criteria, comparative studies and others. The
found implementations were directly included in the scope
of this survey. Comparative studies were scanned to collect
the different implementations, which were investigated further.
This resulted in 32 different implementations.
Finally all the found identity solutions were read com-
pletely to extract the specifications according to the used
evaluation criteria. In this process 20 of the found solutions
were discarded as they turned out to not be SSI solutions.
V. SELECTION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA
Evaluation criteria are necessary to be able to discuss and
reason about the need of blockchain-technology in the field
of SSI. The criteria used in this paper are formulated as
properties, which will be presented in this section.
The main ideas behind the seven laws of K. Cameron
[7] are incorporated in the properties by C. Allen [8], but
formulated in a more comprehensive way. By splitting these
seven laws into more distinct properties, the SSI solutions can
be assessed more in-depth. Q. Stokkink and J. Pouwelse make
a valid point by arguing that claims of a user do not mean
anything if you cannot prove them [3]. Each of these papers
3builds upon the previous one and the found eleven properties
seem to be a complete list of features SSI solutions ought to
have.
Therefore, the ten properties described by C. Allen, ac-
companied with the property of claims being provable, will
form the basis of this comparative study. Below these eleven
properties are quoted from the paper by Q. Stokkink and J.
Pouwelse. For consistency, each property is complemented
with our interpretation.
1) Existence. Users must have an independent existence.
An SSI should be based on an identity in the real world
and cannot exist exclusively in the digital world. At any
time, a person should be able to independently create a
digital identity, without the intervention of a third party.
2) Control. Users must control their identities.
Users have the full authority over their identity. ”They
should always be able to refer to it, update it, or even
hide it” [8].
3) Access. Users must have access to their own data.
All personal claims and data should be easily retrievable
for a user. No personal data is hidden for the user.
4) Transparency. Systems and algorithms must be trans-
parent.
SSI solutions and their algorithms should be open in how
they function, how they are managed and updated. ”The
algorithms should be free, open-source, well-known, and
as independent as possible of any particular architecture”
[8].
5) Persistence. Identities must be long-lived.
Identities can only be removed by the user. Claims can
be updated and removed, but the identity that belongs
to these claims should be long-lived.
6) Portability. Information and services about identity
must be transportable.
An identity should not be held solely by a third party.
It should be transportable, since third parties may dis-
appear.
7) Interoperability. Identities should be as widely usable
as possible.
A true SSI is globally usable and not limited to certain
niches.
8) Consent. Users must agree to the use of their identity.
Claims and data cannot be shared without the user’s
consent. Users are in control of the sharing of their data.
9) Minimalization. Disclosure of claims must be mini-
mized.
Only the necessary data must be shared, when sharing
some part of an identity. For example only sharing being
older than 18, instead of your date of birth. This property
fits well with zero-knowledge proofs.
10) Protection. The rights of users must be protected.
The rights and freedoms of individuals have priority over
the needs of the network.
11) Provable. Claims must be shown to hold true.
It should be possible for claims to be verified, for
example by trusted third parties.
Blockchain technology already encompasses some of the
eleven properties mentioned above. This makes it interesting
to investigate the differences each blockchain implementation
has on top of these generic properties. As Q. Stokkink and
J. Pouwelse have mentioned in their paper [3]; data on the
blockchain is not deleted, only appended. This provides a
blockchain-based solution the persistence property. They also
explain that the consensus algorithm that forms the basis of a
blockchain gives the transparency property, since it provides
a global truth that is known to at least 51% of the network.
What is not mentioned here, is the possibility of blockchain as
an underlying system and the functionality on top of that not
being transparent. Any additional non-transparent functionality
will be taken into account in our evaluation.
VI. EVALUATION
After selection of the implementations that at first hand
look related to Self-Sovereign Identity solutions, 11 of them
were included in the review. First a brief overview, indicating
the unique aspects of the different implementations is pro-
vided. Finally, the properties satisfied by the implementations
are presented in Table I and Table II for the blockchain-based
and other variants respectively.
A. Overview of the current implementations
1) Blockchain solutions:
a) uPort: uPort is an open-source Ethereum based
blockchain solution [11]. An identity is created through an app
on the user’s phone. This app holds all the data linked to the
identity. It also holds the private keys, used to sign attestations
and share them with others. Storing the data locally provides
control over and access to the identity for the user and enforces
them to provide consent before others can use the information.
uPort identities are capable of signing attestations about
other identities and publish them on the blockchain, increasing
the trustworthiness of such claims. As only other uPort-
identities are able to attest, uPort lacks portability. The only
other information stored publicly on the blockchain is a
Decentralized ID (DID). DIDs are used as the identity and link
to the public key of the user. All the requests and responses are
transferred using industry standards, representing all different
kinds of private information in a structured manner providing
interoperability.
The identity consists also of several smart contracts placed
on the blockchain. One is used to allow a persistent digital
identity. As the private key is stored on the smart phone, losing
such a device would result in losing the identity. A social
system of trustees is able to vote to replace the private key,
allowing the recovery of an identity.
b) IDchainZ: IDchainZ is a proof of concept and an
extension of the ChainZy Smart Ledger [12]. The program
enables users to hold a key ring of certified identity doc-
uments and allows multiple external parties to add, certify
and exchange know-your-customer (KYC) and anti-money
laundering (AML) documentation. This is later extended to
be used for all kinds of different documents.
A user grants permission to a third party to access their data.
This can be limited by the user in duration, information shared
4and number of accesses. This allows the user to have control
over it’s data. The user can also revoke access to its data
anytime but it will need the private keys to do this. Otherwise
the data will remain in the blockchain.
In the paper, nothing is mentioned about the minimalization
of data. IDchainz is however widely available since it can be
accessed within a browser.
c) EverID: EverID is a user-centric, SSI and value
transfer solution based on blockchain technology and the
cryptographic underpinnings of that system [13]. In contrast
to uPort, EverID’s decentralized system is used to store and
confirm user identity data, documentation and bio metrics.
EverID facilitates verification of users by multiple third-parties
and allows the secure transfer of value between members
of the network. This means that claims made by users are
provable. The decentralized architecture of the platform also
provides personal data ownership which can only be accessed
by the user. The individual’s data is recorded in a manner
that allows the individual control how it is shared, with whom
and for how long (persistence). This sharing mechanism is
enforced by smart contracts per transaction with automated
resolutions. The EverID infrastructure is operated on a series
of supernodes in the network. These supernodes are the host
of the blockchain. They also host the Bridge Service to allow
individuals to transfer their data to an EverID app and the
API Server to enable transactions from SDK-enabled devices.
This makes EverID portable. What distinguishes EverID from
other solutions is that one does not need to have a device since
the digital identity (combination of biometrics, government ID
and third party confirmations) can be stored in the cloud.
Nonetheless EverID does not meet the minimalization
property. When data is required to verify a claim, the user
will fully disclose this particular data. If one is for example
interested to know whether the user is over 18, the user
can choose to disclose it’s complete date of birth or to not
disclose it at all. EverID is also not open source so the
claims made in the whitepapers are not provable. Although
EverID is a blockchain-based solution we conclude they are
not transparant.
d) Sovrin: Sovrin network is a public permissioned
distributed ledger [14]. This means that users can see the
transactions but not necessarily initiate transactions. As a
result, the need for proof-of-work is removed. This shows
that they use a distributed consensus protocol which focuses
more on security and scalability. This solution meets also the
requirement of minimalization by enabling selective disclosure
of claims using zero-knowledge proofs. Therefore no data will
be shared without the user’s consent and this gives the identity
owners control over their digital identity.
However, there are some problems: they do not seem to
provide or require any (verifiable) guarantees with respect to
the correct functioning of agents in the network [15]. Therefore
we conclude that they do not meet the 11th property provable.
Finally Sovrin is not portable since identities are held solely
by one third party, the foundation.
e) LifeID: LifeID is a self-sovereign digital identity
platform which enable users to create their own independent
online identity [16]. Users control all the online real-world
transactions where authenticating identification is needed,
without the need for third-party corporations or government
agencies. LifeID is used in combination with a bio-metric-
capable smart phone and app. Only the user can approve
third party’s request for information - always needs the user’s
consent. LifeID utilizes zero-knowledge proofs. The data is
stored on user’s device and only the needed information
is released when identity needs to be verified. The use of
zero-knowledge proofs is maximized making LifeID meet the
minimalization requirement. LifeID identity can be backed up
and recovered through three different options: back up on
cold storage, with close family or friends and with a trusted
organization. This gives the users ability to fight against theft
by being able to deactivate identity temporarily and recover
through the three above mentioned options. This is also how
LifeID delivers protection against identity theft to its users, by
letting the authentic owner deactivate the identity and recover
it at a later moment.
f) SelfKey: SelfKey is a Self-Sovereign digital iden-
tity network [17]. With SelfKey, user’s data is stored on a
device under the owner’s control. This gives the user total
control over his/her own independent identity. When a third
party wants to collect specific data, which is stored on the
blockchain, the user can choose to reveal it. The process of
doing so is similar to authentication via ”linking” a Facebook
account. When approving third party data collection, SelfKey
makes sure that only the minimum necessary amount of data
can be collected by using zero knowledge proofs. SelfKey
thus fulfills the consent and minimalization properties. To
authenticate an identity, Selfkey makes use of force-resilient,
censorship resistant algorithms. These independent algorithms
are decentralized. Identity claims by the user can be verified
only by trusted entities making sure the provable property to
be fulfilled.
g) Shocard: The ShoCard Identity Management Plat-
form is implemented using blockchain [18]. The platform con-
sists of three main functions: Authentication of an individual
or an entity, exchange of authorization, and exchange of attes-
tation. Shocard has the existence property because the identity
of the user is first obtained with a phone number, an official
document like a passport or some biometric information.
The user has control over its own data. It can be stored locally
and only the verification of the documents is stored publicly.
This leads to having the property portability. It also minimizes
the data to verify an attribute of the identity. Only the user can
choose to share the data. This means that access is a property
of Shocard as well.
The algorithms of Shocard are well documented, open-source
and independent on different types of blockchainso trans-
parency is present. Because Shocard is able to work on
different blockchains, the identity of the person can remain
valid even if some blockchain stops to work. That is why
the platform is persistent as well. The remaining property
protection does also count in the Shocard algorithm because
it uses a distributed network; blockchain.
h) Sora: The Sora identity solution [19] is a
blockchain solution based upon JSON-LD standardized key-
value pairs. Storage of properties per attribute enables selective
5disclosure of information. A mobile application is available
where a user is capable of creating an arbitrary number of
identities, providing pseudonymity.
The private key is not solely stored on the mobile device
but constructed from a master password. Once an identity is
established it is easy to use that identity on other devices as
the created key-value pairs are encrypted and stored on an
accessible centralized server. Under normal circumstances the
identity is stored on the mobile device, but extra persistence
is provided by the backup.
A user is in full control of and always has access to its data
as no one is capable of deciphering the stored key-value pairs
without the private key, i.e. consent. This also protects the user
from unauthorized access. The paper states that ”any user with
a DID is able to issue a verifiable claim about themselves or
other users” and provides the structure in which the verifiable
claims should be stored.
2) Non-Blockchain variants:
a) PDS: Personal Data Storages (PDS) are environ-
ments where the user has full control on the access of
other parties. This architecture allows for both local [20] and
(distributed) online storage [21]. As the data is stored locally,
the query is processed on the PDS itself. Only the answer
of the query is sent back, enabling complete control about
the data that is used and minimalisation of the information
exposed.
When the data is stored online, nodes with different tasks
communicate together to protect against unauthorized access.
The data is split up in undecipherable chunks and distributed
over several storage nodes. Another type of node, the index
node, keeps track of the mapping of the key used to decipher
the information and the key of each individual chunk of private
information. The audit nodes keep track of the meaning of
the information, the owner of the data and with whom the
information is shared.
(open)PDS does not propose standard formats to store the
information in. This implies that a user has more control about
what is stored for broader use-cases and provides foperability.
It is stated that the way in which the identities used by the
data owners and processors are authenticated and authorized is
complex and not in the scope of the paper but will be revisited
at a later date. As this is not available at the moment, there is
no support for the provability of the identity.
b) IRMA: IRMA stands for I Reveal My Attributes
and implements the Idemix attribute-based credential scheme
[22]. Users receive digitally signed attributes from trusted
issuers like the government. This means that claims made
are provable. These claims must be stored in the IRMA app
on a phones (or tablet), after which the user can selectively
disclose attributes to others. This also means that their identity
can not be used without the user’s consent. This way IRMA
puts users in control over their digital identity. IRMA meets
the (minimalization) property by using zero-knowledge proofs.
Using the issuer’s digital signature over the attributes the
verifier can verify that the attributes were given to the user
in the past, and that they have not been modified since. An
authentication is needed in order to obtain a certain attribute
from an issuer. Part of the digital signature on a certain
attribute is an expiration date [23]. This is necessary because
an attribute like ”I am not older than 18” may not be true after
a while. IRMA’s drawback is that losing your phone means
losing your identity. All the attributes need to be collected
again. This means that it is not persistent since no user will
have the same device his or her whole life. The decision
to make IRMA data-protective to this extent makes them
portable: users can bring their phones wherever they want.
IRMA is currently running a trial with Gemeente Nijmegen
showing that they are interoperable.
c) reclaimID: reclaimID is an architecture that builds
on top of a name system that potentially is blockchain-based
[24]. Depending on the underlying name system, different
properties can be assigned to reclaimID.
The architecture makes it possible for a user to create an
identity (existence) and securely share its attributes, without
having a centralized service provider. The attributes are added
by the user and encrypted with attribute-based encryption
(ABE). The users can add, delete and update their attributes,
giving them full control. The user owns the private keys to
their attributes, making sure the user has full access to all per-
sonal attributes. To ensure the protection of the user’s rights,
the identity and attributes are stored locally and are shared in
a decentralized manner, avoiding control by a third party. This
provides the protection property. The user can decide to which
parties certain attributes are revealed, providing the consent
property. These parties can then access these attributes, even
if the user is offline (after being granted access once). This
offline availability is only possible when the requesting party
uses the name system. A requesting party can get access to
an attribute ”... through the name system or via an out-of-
band exchange, for example using a web-based authorization
protocol.” [24]. This means that a requesting party is only
bound by the name system in case of offline authorization,
thus otherwise being portable as the out-of-band exchange can
be anything. reclaimID is free and the source code is available
online. Therefore the architecture itself is transparent, but the
underlying name system may not be. The attributes are user-
defined, so reclaimID can be used in any area where identity is
needed (interoperability). Initially, the claims in reclaimID are
self-attested. It is possible however, to use reclaimID to share
third party attested attributes. Some claims in reclaimID are
thus not provable, but might be in the future since reclaimID is
working on this. Minimalization is not built in the architecture,
but could be implemented additionally. Finally, the persistence
of the identity within reclaimID is fully dependent on the
underlying name system. If a blockchain implementation is
used, it would be persistent, but other implementations may
lack this property.
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TABLE CONTAINING THE REVIEWED BLOCKCHAIN-BASED IMPLEMENTATIONS ANNOTATED WITH WHICH CRITERIA ARE SATISFIED (1) BY THEM, AND
WHICH ARE NOT (0).
Existence Control Access Transparency Persistence Portability Interoperability Consent Minimalization Protection Provable
IDchainz 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Uport 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
EverID 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sovrin 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
LifeID 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SelfKey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Shocard 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sora 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE II
TABLE CONTAINING THE REVIEWED NON-BLOCKCHAIN-BASED IMPLEMENTATIONS ANNOTATED WITH WHICH CRITERIA ARE SATISFIED (1) BY THEM,
AND WHICH ARE NOT (0).
Existence Control Access Transparency Persistence Portability Interoperability Consent Minimalization Protection Provable
PDS 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
IRMA 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
reclaimID 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
VII. DISCUSSION
Although a systematic search has been performed to gather
all the available implementations, most of the found and in this
survey included solutions were blockchain-based. This, how-
ever, does not limit the possibility to discuss the differences
between the two types and find the most important properties.
The comparison between Table I and Table II clearly
shows that on average the blockchain-based solutions fulfill
more properties than the others. In this section the global
differences per property between the two types of implemen-
tations will be discussed.
A. Existence
With every solution users are able to create their own
identity account and most importantly, bind their own identity
into the created digital instance. This is usually done by having
the users storing unique identifying information either offline
as properties or online in their private cloud. In the research
process, we have explicitly filtered out all identity solutions
that were not Self-Sovereign. This could have caused all the
solutions to acquire this property.
B. Control
Both blockchain and non-blockchain based solutions claim
that users have full control over their own identity. Blockchain-
based solutions usually have the users identity claims put on
the blockchain and give the users control of them via their
own private keys. Users can manage their identity and has
control over it as long as they can authenticate themselves.
All the non-blockchain-based solutions store the data locally
on a mobile device or on a user-controlled environment, still
allowing them full control over the user’s identity.
C. Access
All blockchain-based solutions have this property since a
blockchain is always public, anyone can use it to trace back the
authenticity of a user. However, this does not mean that all the
data about the user is public but it is traceable where the data
comes from. For non-blockchain solutions, additional concepts
need to be implemented to still have the access property. PDS
for example solves this by creating audit nodes that keep track
of the owner and with whom the data is shared. Still it is more
difficult to prove that there are no hidden algorithms when not
using blockchain. So blockchain is definitely a better base for
this property.
D. Transparency
A transparent solution uses open-source algorithms and
has a detailed documented system. For most blockchain-based
solutions a well-known blockchain is used. However, this is
not enough for the whole solution to be transparent. Still
almost all solutions have the transparency property. Detailed
documentation about the inner workings of the other imple-
mentations are also available.
E. Persistence
The benefit of using blockchain is that the information
on the blockchain is distributed and saved at every user of
the system. This means that data that verifies the authenti-
cations cannot get lost. So the data is persistent when using
blockchain. However, if a private key is lost it will be difficult
to change or remove the data.
Of the non-blockchain implementations solely (open)PDS
acquired this property, as the user is responsible and in full
control over the storage of the data. IRMA does not yet provide
backups, although it is confirmed to be worked on.
F. Portability
A solution is portable when an identity is not held only
by one third party. Most of the blockchain-based solutions
have this property because the identity is on a distributed
ledger. Also the underlying blockchain technology is often
7well known so it’s not dependent on a third party. But this
depends on what kind of data is saved on the blockchain.
That is why Uport does not have the portability property since
it is only possible for other uPort identities to attest. Not
only blockchain solutions have this property as IRMA and
reclaimID also met this requirement. ReclaimID does this with
out-of-band exchange of information, thus the information can
be communicated through another medium.
G. Interoperability
Every solution discussed in this paper has the interoperabil-
ity property. This is probably because each implementation is
made to be widely available. The solutions that are not, are
used only in niches and therefore hard to find and not used in
this paper.
H. Consent
One of the most important properties of an SSI solution
is that the user must always give consent to revealing any
information to third parties. This is usually achieved by having
the user sign the permission to reveal identity data with its
private key. All the researched solutions fulfill this property,
including the non-blockchain-based solutions. In the research
process, we have explicitly filtered out all identity solutions
that are not identity permission centric, which goes hand in
hand with self-sovereignty. This could have caused all the
solutions to have this property.
I. Minimalization
We define a solution not having the minimalization prop-
erty when it does not clearly provide a way to reveal only a part
of the attributes. This is the case for both various blockchain
and non-blockchain based SSI solutions. The minimalization
property depends on the implementation and thus is indepen-
dent on whether the solutions uses the blockchain or not. In
this regard, there is no difference between the two groups.
J. Protection
The protection property is met in all eleven solutions in this
paper. The freedom and right of the individuals are preserved.
Regardless of the usage of blockchain technology, the SSI
solutions are user centered so protection of them is critical.
K. Provable
A solution fulfills the provable property if it is possi-
ble to see that the claims are verified by trusted parties.
The blockchain-based solutions usually put the signed claims
on the blockchain so that everyone can verify whether the
signatures come from the trusted third parties. Most of the
blockchain based solutions fulfill this property except Sovrin,
which does not provide or require any (verifiable) guarantees.
As for the non-blockhain based solutions, PDS did not pro-
vide any information about verification, thus does not fulfill
the provable property. ReclaimID does not have the claims
verification system yet. The verification system which is used
to prove the claims is usually separately implemented from
the architecture. This means that it does not make a difference
whether it is a blockchain or non-blockchain based solution.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper posed the question whether blockchain-
technology is a necessity for the development of Self-
Sovereign Identity solutions to solve the issues with cur-
rent identity management schemes. It answers this question
by systematically collecting relevant implementations, which
were evaluated according to criteria introduced by C. Allen
and complemented by Q. Stokkink and J. Pouwelse with
provability.
Another purpose of the paper is to form a basis for
future work on implementations that are most promising to
serve as a digital identity solution. Identity sovereignty is
mentioned for the first time in 2012 [3] and is a relative new
field of technology. White-papers about most of the, in this
survey, reviewed solutions are published since 2017. Several
mentioned to initially omit some of the desired properties to
work out the proof of concept. Further research is still actively
being performed, likely causing the field to change in the
future.
Both blockchain-based and other Self-Sovereign Identity
solutions show to fulfill most of the evaluation criteria. The
importance lies in the differences between solutions in both
variants. Blockchain-based solutions definitely meet more
properties on average than the others. IRMA shows that it
is possible to create an SSI solution without blockchain-
technology. We conclude that blockchain-technology is a good
foundation to build a Self-Sovereign Identity solution, but it
is not a necessity.
APPENDIX A
RESEARCH QUERY
The query used to systematically search for papers is as
follows:
( ” Se l f−s o v e r e i g n i d e n t i t y ” OR ” S e l f s o v e r e i g n i d e n t i t y ” )
OR (
( ” block−cha i n ” OR ” b l o c k c h a i n ” )
AND (” i d e n t i t y management ” )
AND (” s o l u t i o n ” OR ” imp l emen t a t i o n ” OR ” rev iew ” OR ” su rv ey ” )
)
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